Citações sobre Patentes de Software

A minha própria introdução às realidades das patentes de software aconteceu nos anos 80 quando a minha cliente Sun Microsystems -- na altura uma pequena empresa -- foi acusada pela IBM de infringir patentes. Ameaçando com um processo legal massivo, a IBM pediu uma reunião para apresentar as suas exigências. Quatorze advogados da IBM e respectivos assistentes, todos vestidos no obrigatório fato azul escuro, amontoaram-se na sala de conferências maior de que a Sun dispunha.

O fato-azul chefe orquestrou a apresentação de sete patentes que a IBM reclamava terem sido infringidas, a mais notória das quais era patente das "linhas gordas" da IBM: Num ecran de computador, para transformar uma linha fina numa linha grossa sobe-se e desce-se uma distância igual a partir das extremidades da linha fina e então liga-se os quatro pontos. Provávelmente todos aprendemos esta técnica para transformar uma linha num rectângulo em geometria do sétimo ano e acreditamos que a mesma foi proposta por Euclides ou outro pensador há qualquer coisa como 3000 anos. Segundo os examinadores do USPTO, que concederam a patente do processo a IBM, não foi assim.

Após a apresentação da IBM chegou a nossa vez. Sob o olhar da equipa do Gigante Azul (que não mostrava uma pinga de emoção), os meus colegas -- todos os quais eram formados simultaneamente em Engenharia e em Direito -- aproximaram-se do quadro branco de marcadores em punho e metódicamente dissecaram e demoliram as reivindicações da IBM. Usamos frases como "Devem estar a brincar," e "Deveriam ter vergonha." A equipa da IBM não mostrou qualquer emoção mas uma pura indiferença. Entre nós chegámos a uma conclusão: Apenas uma das sete patentes da IBM poderia ser declarada válida por um tribunal e nenhum tribunal racional chegaria à conclusão de que a tecnologia da Sun infringia sequer essa patente.

Seguiu-se um silêncio incómodo. Os fatos-azuis nem sequer falaram entre si. Permaneceram sentados como se fossem de pedra. Finalmente o fato chefe replicou. Disse: "OK, talvez vocês não infrinjam nenhuma destas sete patentes mas nós temos 10.000. Querem realmente que voltemos para Armonk [a sede da IBM em Nova Iorque] e encontremos sete patentes que vocês infrinjam? Ou querem tornar as coisas mais fáceis e pagarem-nos somente 20 milhões de dólares?" Após alguma negociação a Sun passou um cheque à IBM e os fatos-azuis passaram à empresa seguinte da sua lista de alvos.

Na América corporativa este tipo de ataque repete-se semanalmente. A patente como estímulo à invenção há muito tempo que deu lugar à patente como puro instrumento de estrangulamento da inovação.

Imagine que é proprietário de uma pequena empresa de software. Imagine que escreveu um software potente. Esse software é uma combinação criativa de 1000 regras abstractas (algoritmos) e de uma grande quantidade de dados. Cada regra levou entre alguns minutos a algumas horas a [re]inventar, enquanto que o desenvolvimento e depuração de todo este trabalho levou 20 anos-homem. Das 1000 regras, 900 eram já conhecidas há mais de 20 anos. 50 das regras estão agora cobertas por patentes. A sua empresa é dona de 3 dessas patentes, para as obter teve que correr até ao gabinete de patentes, revelar as suas estratégias de negócio e pagar os custos dos advogados. A IBM e a Microsoft estão já entretanto a converter as suas ideias patenteadas em lucro. Vai querer pará-las? As equipas de advogados delas dizem que você infringe 20 a 30 das suas 50000 patentes. Então chegam a um acordo de cavalheiros: 3% da sua facturação anual vai para a IBM, 2% para a Microsoft, 2% .... Mesmo assim, um dia a empresa torna-se lucrativa. É agora dono de uma empresa atractiva. Uma agência de patentes aborda-o. Está a infringir duas ou três das suas patentes, dizem eles. Querem 100.000 Euros. Um processo em tribunal pode levar anos e custar 1 milhão de Euros. Você paga. Um mês mais tarde, a agência de patentes seguinte bate à porta .... Em pouco tempo ficaria falido. Procura protecção de uma grande empresa. A Microsoft oferece-se para lhe comprar a empresa por um valor simbólico. Você aceita. Sob um sistema de direitos de autor você teria ficado independente e rico. Por meio das patentes a Microsoft e outros conseguiram roubar a sua propriedade intelectual.

O software é sob vários aspectos semelhante às outras áreas da engenharia. Mas há uma diferença fundamental: um programa de computador é construido a partir de objectos matemáticos ideais. Um programa faz sempre exactamente o que diz fazer. Podemos construir um castelo no ar seguro por uma linha de espessura zero, e o castelo manter-se-á no ar.

A maquinaria física não é tão predizível porque os objectos físicos são temperamentais. Se num programa está escrito que deve contar entre um e mil, o programa fará exactamente isso. Se construirmos o contador com maquinaria, uma correia pode derrapar e contar duas vezes o número 58, ou uma engrenagem pode falhar e o número 572 pode ser passado à frente. Estes problemas tornam muito difícil o projecto de maquinaria fiável.

When we programmers put a while statement inside an if statement, we don't have to worry about whether the while statement will run such a long time that it will burn out the if statement, or that it will rub against the if statement and wear it out. We don't have to worry that it will vibrate at the wrong speed and the if statement will resonate and crack. We don't have to worry about physical replacement of the broken if statement. We don't have to worry about whether the if statement can deliver enough current to the while statement without a voltage drop. There are many problems of hardware design that we don't have to worry about.

The result is that software is far easier to design, per component, than hardware. This is why designers today use software rather than hardware wherever they can. This is also why teams of a few people often develop computer programs of tremendous complexity.

As pessoas perguntam-me ingénuamente: "Se o teu programa é inovador então não terás obviamente a patente?" Esta pergunta parte do princípio de que a um produto corresponderá uma patente.

Em algumas áreas, tal como a indústria farmaceutica, as patentes realmente funcionam dessa forma. O software está no extremo oposto> uma patente típica cobre inúmeros programas distintos e mesmo um programa completamente inovador infringirá provávelmente inúmeras patentes.

Isto é assim porque um programa substancial tem que combinar um grande número de técnicas diferentes e implementar muitas características. mesmo se algumas sejam invenções novas, ainda restarão muitas que não o são. Qualquer técnica ou característica com menos de duas décadas é provável que esteja já patenteada por outro. Se está mesmo ou não é uma questão de sorte.

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I've explained how patents impede progress. Do they also encourage it?

Patents may encourage a few people to look for new ideas to patent. This isn't a big help because we had plenty of innovation without patents. (Look at the journals and advertisements of 1980 and you'll see.) New ideas are not the limiting factor for progress in our field. The hard job in software is developing large systems.

People developing systems have new ideas from time to time. Naturally they use these ideas. Before patents, they published the ideas too, for kudos. As long as we have a lot of software development, we will have a steady flow of new published ideas.

The patent system impedes development. It makes us ask, for each design decision, "Will we get sued?" And the answer is a matter of luck. This leads to more expensive development and less of it.

With less development, programmers will have fewer ideas along the way. Patents can actually reduce the number of patentable ideas that are published.

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Uma década atrás a área do software funcionava sem patentes. Sem patentes foram produzidas inovações tais como os sistemas de janelas, a realidade virtual, as folhas de cálculo e as redes. E por causa da ausência das patentes, os programadores poderão desenvolver software que usasse estas inovações.

Não pedimos que esta situação mudasse, a mudança foi-nos imposta. Não há qualquer dúvida de que as patentes de software nos deixam amarrados. Se não há nenhum interesse público claro e vital em nos deixar amarrados em burocracia, libertem-nos e deixem-nos voltar ao trabalho.

Software is closer to math (non-patentable) than to chemistry (often cited as a success story of the patent system)

The american experience of software patents is a disaster. Before imitating them we should rather try to see if they won't agree to change their system.

In order to do that, it will be necessary to lobby the big american corporations.

The european software companies prefer to live with the pressure of having to improve constantly to the pressure of having to apply for patents, attack other companies and live with a constant risk of infringing on other companies' patents

Free software is an orthogonal problem. One could imagine applying for patents before publishing free software on the Net and thus creating inextricable legal situations.

The argument that the software startups are not able to access capital without patents is a lie. I have never encountered this kind of case.

My observation is that patents have not been a positive force in stimulating innovation at Cisco. Competition has been the motivator; bringing new products to market in a timely manner is critical. Everything we have done to create new products would have been done even if we could not obtain patents on the innovations and inventions contained in these products. I know this because no one has ever asked me "can we patent this?" before deciding whether to invest time and resources into product development.

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The time and money we spend on patent filings, prosecution, and maintenance, litigation and licensing could be better spent on product development and research leading to more innovation. But we are filing hundreds of patents each year for reasons unrelated to promoting or protecting innovation.

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Moreover, stockpiling patents does not really solve the problem of unintentional patent infringement through independent development. If we are accused of infringement by a patent holder who does not make and sell products, or who sells in much smaller volume than we do, our patents do not have sufficient value to the other party to deter a lawsuit or reduce the amount of money demanded by the other company. Thus, rather than rewarding innovation, the patent system penalizes innovative companies who successfully bring new products to the marketplace and it subsidizes or rewards those who fail to do so.

Like other companies operating in the telecommunications industry, we experience frequent litigation regarding patent and other intellectual property rights. Third parties have asserted, and in the future may assert, claims against us alleging that we infringe their intellectual property rights. Defending these claims may be expensive and divert the efforts of our management and technical personnel. If we do not succeed in defending these claims, we could be required to expend significant resources to develop non-infringing technology or to obtain licenses to the technology that is the subject of the litigation. In addition, third parties may attempt to appropriate the confidential information and proprietary technologies and processes used in our business, which we may be unable to prevent.

Our business and results of operations will be harmed if we are unable to acquire licenses for third party technologies on reasonable terms.

We remain dependent in part on third party license agreements which enable us to use third party technology to develop or produce our products. However, we cannot be certain that any such licenses will be available to us on commercially reasonably terms, if at all.

As I'm sure this committee is aware, there is a general animosity to pure software patents within and outside of the industry due to, one, the perceived allowance of what I'll diplomatically call overbroad patent claims, and two, the historically non-proprietary culture of the software engineering industry.

In sum, largely because the current patent system is poorly fashioned for the software design tool industry, the industry has evolved to minimize the impact that patents have on competition and has relied on other more market-oriented drivers of innovation. I believe this is a missed opportunity for accelerating technological and economic growth in the industry.

As a small company, one of the biggest risks I face is uncertainty in the marketplace. I can minimize my risk by understanding my competitor's products very well, by understanding my products very well, by understanding what the consumers and customers want. But I've found in the past year that I really can't understand the patent landscape and that I'm sitting with a nuclear bomb on top of my products that could go off at any point and cause me to simply not have a business anymore.

I recently took one of my lead developers, a gentleman who's widely considered a leader in his field -- he sits on both the MPEG and the ITU committees, is deeply involved with the entire intellectual property landscape around digital video -- and asked him to evaluate a particular patent that we've been hearing about in the marketplace.

We did a quick search on the USPTO website, which by the way is very useful, and uncovered no less than 120 patents that claim to be within the general scope of this particular patent, which was widely cited.

The poor guy spent the better part of five days examining all these different patents and came back to me saying, "I haven't the slightest idea whether or not we infringe on these patents, and frankly, they all seem to infringe on one another."

The end result being that I have no idea whether my product infringes on upwards of 120 different patents, all of which are held by large companies who could sue me without thinking about it.

The end result, much like Borland, I have now issued a directive that we reallocate roughly 20 to 35 percent of our developer's resources and sign on two separate law firms to increase our patent portfolio to be able to engage in the patent spew conflict. I think the concept here would be called saber rattling. I need to be able to say, "Yeah, I've got that patented too, so go away and leave me alone."

Let me make my position on the patentability of software clear. I believe that software per se should not be allowed patent protection. I take this position as the creator of software and as the beneficiary of the rewards that innovative software can bring in the marketplace. I do not take this position because I or my company are eager to steal the ideas of others in our industry. Adobe has built its business by creating new markets with new software. We take this position because it is the best policy for maintaining a healthy software industry, where innovation can prosper.

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For example, when we at Adobe founded a company on the concept of software to revolutionize the world of printing, we believed that there was no possibility of patenting our work. That belief did not stop us from creating that software, nor did it deter the savvy venture capitalists who helped us with the early investment. We have done very well despite our having no patents on our original work.

On the other hand, the emergence in recent years of patents on software has hurt Adobe and the industry. A "patent litigation tax" is one impediment to our financial health that our industry can ill-afford. Resources that could have been used to further innovation have been diverted to the patent problem. Engineers and scientists such as myself who could have been creating new software instead are working on analyzing patents, applying for patents and preparing defenses. Revenues are being sunk into legal costs instead of into research and development. It is clear to me that the Constitutional mandate to promote progress in the useful arts is not served by the issuance of patents on software.

Intouch is an e-business company that owns many patents and has been attacked with patents, including by Amazon. Joshua Kaplan is their president and CEO. These excerpts are from his statement at the FTC hearings of 2002:

There are patents that come out today with hundreds of claims, unintelligible to almost anyone except the people who drew them. And yet, people who violate them jeopardize sometimes a lifetime of investment or their division or their product. That system doesn't work well to spur innovation or carry out the constitutional mandate.

Indeed, for those of you who were here this morning and listened to the people in the software industry talk about how threatening this is to their businesses, as I see it, patents today are often entrenching the established at the expense of allowing the newcomer to come in. I question today whether a Steve Jobs could start an Apple or a Bill Gates could start a Microsoft in view of the web and thicket of patents that is out there.

Oracle Corporation opposes the patentability of software. The Company believes that existing copyright law and available trade secret protections, as opposed to patent law, are better suited to protecting computer software developments.

Patent law provides to inventors an exclusive right to new technology in return for publication of the technology. This is not appropriate for industries such as software development in which innovations occur rapidly, can be made without a substantial capital investment, and tend to be creative combinations of previously-known techniques.

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Unfortunately, as a defensive strategy, Oracle has been forced to protect itself by selectively applying for patents which will present the best opportunities for cross-licensing between Oracle and other companies who may allege patent infringement.

Although all that I "invented" were innovative, all utilized complex procedures and all were valued by those who paid millions to use what my innovative entrepreneurial risk created, it never occurred to me to patent them, and I could not have patented those "useful arts" if I had wanted to.

The fundamental question is: Do we want to permit the monopoly possession of everything that works like logical intellectual processes. I hope not.

The mind has always been sacrosanct. The claim that intellectual processes and logical procedures (that do not primarily manipulate devices) can be possessed and monopolized extends greed and avarice much too far. Algorithmic intellectual processes must remain unpatentable -- even when represented by binary coding in a computer; even when executed by the successor to the calculator.

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What frightens and infuriates so many of us about software patents is that they seek to monopolize our intellectual processes when their representation and performance is aided by a machine.

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Everything that is represented or performed by software is first a completely-detailed algorithmic intellectual process. There are no exceptions, other than by error.

Thus, I respectfully object to the title for these hearings -- "Software-Related Inventions" -- since you are not primarily concerned with gadgets that are controlled by software. The title illustrates an inappropriate and seriously-misleading bias. In fact, in more than a quarter-century as a computer professional and observer and writer in this industry, I don't recall ever hearing or reading such a phrase -- except in the context of legalistic claims for monopoly, where the claimants were trying to twist the tradition of patenting devices in order to monopolize the execution of intellectual processes.

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There is absolutely no evidence, whatsoever -- not a single iota -- that software patents have promoted or will promote progress.

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The company for which I am speaking, Autodesk, holds some number of software patents and has applied for others -- which, of course, remain secret under current U.S. law. However, all are defensive -- an infuriating waste of our technical talent and financial resources, made necessary only by the lawyer's invention of software patents.

Autodesk has faced at least 17 baseless patent claims made against it and has spent over a million dollars defending itself, with millions more certain to pour down the bottomless patent pit unless we halt this debacle. Fortunately -- unlike smaller software producers -- we have the financial and technical resources to rebuff such claims. We rebutted all but one of the claims, even before the patent-holders could file frivolous law-suits, and will litigate the remaining claim to conclusion. Note that your Office has issued at least 16 patents that we have successfully rebutted, and we never paid a penny in these attempted extortions that your Office assisted.

But it was an enormous waste of resources that could have better been invested in useful innovation. These unending baseless claims benefit patent lawyers, but they certainly do not promote progress.

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We offer two recommendations, the second having twelve parts -- so to speak, the 12 Apostles of Redress:

FIRST: Issue a finding that software, as I have defined it, implements intellectual processes that have no physical incarnation; processes that are exclusively analytical, intellectual, logical and algorithmic in nature. Use this finding plus the clearly-stated Constitutional intent, to declare that the Patent Office acted in error when it granted software patents. Declare that software patents monopolize intellectual and algorithmic processes, and also fail to fulfill the Constitutional mandate to promote progress -- that in fact, they clearly threaten it.

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SECOND: Until -- and only until -- software patents are definitively prohibited, reject or at least freeze all such applications that have not yet been granted, pending conclusive action on all of the following twelve recommendations:

REDRESS SERIOUS ERRORS OF PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATIONS: Issue a finding that there have been extensive and serious errors of judgment in a large percentage of software patents granted in the past, and immediately recall all software patents for re-review and possible revocation.

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Let us stand on each others' shoulders, rather than on each others' toes.

Because it is impossible to know what patent applications are in the application pipeline, it is entirely possible, even likely, to develop software which incorporates features that are the subject of another firm's patent application. Thus, there is no avoiding the risk of inadvertently finding oneself being accused of a patent infringement simply because no information was publicly available at the time which could have offered guidance of what to avoid.

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The period of patent protection, 17 years, no longer makes sense in an era when an entire generation of technology passes within a few years.

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If some future litigant is successful in upholding rights to one of these "bad" patents, it will require expensive and time-consuming litigation, whose outcome is frankly uncertain, to defend the rights of creators which should never have been challenged in the first place.

If people had understood how patents would be granted when most of today's ideas were invented and had taken out patents, the industry would be at a complete standstill today. ... The solution is patenting as much as we can. A future startup with no patents of its own will be forced to pay whatever price the giants choose to impose. That price might be high. Established companies have an interest in excluding future competitors.

Opera Software's position in the RF/RAND debate is that the fundamental standards for the Web must continue to be royalty free (RF). Therefore, we do not think W3C should describe procedures for RAND licensing. Doing so would help legitimize software patents which we think are harmful to the development of the Web. Also, software patents is largely an American concept not recognized in other parts of the world.

I do not look up any patents on principle, because (a) it's a horrible waste of time and (b) I don't want to know.

The fact is, technical people are better off not looking at patents. If you don't know what they cover and where they are, you won't be knowingly infringing on them. If somebody sues you, you change the algorithm or you just hire a hit-man to whack the stupid git.

Today I received a polite phone call from a fellow at Microsoft who works in the Windows Media group. He informed me that Microsoft has intellectual property rights on the ASF format and told me that, although the implementation was still illegal since it infringed on Microsoft patents. I have asked for the specific patent numbers, since I find patenting a file format a bit strange. At his request, and much to my own sadness, I have removed support for ASF in VirtualDub 1.3d, since I cannot risk a legal confrontation.)

I'm a professional software developer who early summer 1998 wrote a computer program that I decided to put on my homepage. The program turned out to be a tremendous success and was quickly distributed in millions of copies, obviously filling a need among many computer users. I quickly started to improve my program and release new versions. That same autumn I was contacted by a large company with a competing product, who claimed that my program infringed on certain patents they had been granted. Consulting SEPTO gave no reason to take infringement claims seriously since computer programs are not patentable as such, but in early 1999 my legal advisor explained that the legal uncertainty lately introduced by EPO would perhaps make the claims valid. That eventually forced me to stop making my program available.

Do you believe a corporation should have the right to control what computer programs I can write and publish?

I had to stop this project, because I cannot afford to pay an army of lawyers every time someone wants to impose conditions on my work. Software developpers react very sensitively to this kind of terrorism. If European politicians legalise software patents in Europe, that will work as a disinscentive to software production in Europe.

Le logiciel est-il donc finalement brevetable?

Sans doute pas encore.

En réalité, les règles nationales et conventionnelles sont claires: elles posent sans équivoque un principe de non-brevetabilité du logiciel. Le jeu qui se joue aujourd'hui consiste à contourner d'une manière ou d'une autre celles-ci, par exemple en imaginant de considérer, comme on l'a vu, l'ensemble constitué par le matériel et le logiciel comme une machine virtuelle susceptible (demain ...) d'être breveteée. À ce compte-là, on peut parler brevets. Les brevets susceptibles d'être ainsi obtenus, par ce canal ou un autre, n'ont, toutefois, que la valeur qu'on leur prête - mais il ne faut pas écarter l'hypothèse selon laquelle on finirait par une sorte de consensus à ne pas vraiment la discuter. De fait, l'efficacité de ce countournement des règles légales sera largement fonction du fait qu'un tel consensus se dégagera pour accepter --- contre les règles positives --- que ce nouveau jeu se joue ou non. La question ne se situe plus sur le terrain juridique stricto sensu.

Sur ce terrain, c'est en termes d'évolution des règles écrites qu'il faudrait se situer (en termes de levée des interdits).

Stets ist aber die planmäßige Benutzung beherrschbarer Naturkräfte als unabdingbare Voraussetzung für die Bejahung des technischen Charakters einer Erfindung bezeichnet worden. Wie dargelegt, würde die Einbeziehung menschlicher Verstandeskräfte als solcher in den Kreis der Naturkräfte, deren Benutzung zur Schaffung einer Neuerung den technischen Charakter derselben begründen, zur Folge haben, dass schlechthin allen Ergebnissen menschlicher Gedankentätigkeit, sofern sie nur eine Anweisung zum planmäßigen Handeln darstellen und kausal übersehbar sind, technische Bedeutung zugesprochen werden müsste. Damit würde aber der Begriff des Technischen praktisch aufgegeben, würde Leistungen der menschlichen Verstandestätigkeit der Schutz des Patentrechts eröffnet, deren Wesen und Begrenzung nicht zu erkennen und übersehen ist.

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Es ließe sich ferner mit guten Gründen die Auffassung vertreten, dass angesichts der Einhelligkeit, mit der Rechtsprechung und Literatur seit jeher die Beschränkung des Patentschutzes auf technische Erfindungen vertreten haben, von einem gewohnheitsrechtlichen Satz dieses Inhalts gesprochen werden kann.

Das mag aber letztlich dahinstehen. Denn der Begriff der Technik erscheint auch sachlich als das einzig brauchbare Abgrenzungskriterium gegenüber andersartigen geistigen Leistungen des Menschen, für die ein Patentschutz weder vorgesehen noch geeignet ist. Würde man diese Grenzziehung aufgeben, dann gäbe es beispielsweise keine sichere Möglichkeit mehr, patentierbare Leistungen von solchen zu unterscheiden, denen nach dem Willen des Gesetzgebers andere Arten des Leistungsschutzes, insbesondere Urheberrechtsschutz, zuteil werden soll. Das System des deutschen gewerblichen und Urheberrechtsschutzes beruht aber wesentlich darauf, dass für bestimmte Arten geistiger Leistungen je unterschiedliche, ihnen besonders angepasste Schutzbestimmungen gelten und dass Überschneidungen zwischen diesen verschiedenen Leistungsschutzrechten nach Möglichkeit ausgeschlossen sein sollten. Das Patentgesetz ist auch nicht als ein Auffangbecken gedacht, in welchem alle etwa sonst nicht gesetzlich begünstigten geistigen Leistungen Schutz finden sollten. Es ist vielmehr als ein Spezialgesetz für den Schutz eines umgrenzten Kreises geistiger Leistungen, eben der technischen, erlassen und stets auch als solches verstanden und angewendet worden.

Es verbietet sich demnach, den Schutz von geistigen Leistungen auf dem Weg über eine Erweiterung der Grenzen des Technischen -- die auf deren Aufgabe hinauslaufen würde -- zu erlangen. Es muss vielmehr dabei verbleiben, dass eine reine Organisations- und Rechenregel, deren einzige Beziehung zum Reich der Technik in ihrer Benutzbarkeit für den bestimmungsgemäßen Betrieb einer bekannten Datenverarbeitungsanlage besteht, keinen Patentschutz verdient. Ob ihr auf andere Weise, etwa mit Hilfe des Urheber- oder des Wettbewerbsrechts, Schutz zuteil werden kann, ist hier nicht zu erörtern.

Wie der Senat in seiner Entscheidung "Dispositionsprogramm" ausgeführt hat, entscheidet sich die Frage nach dem technischen Charakter einer Lehre nicht nach deren sprachlicher Einkleidung. Es ist deshalb ohne entscheidende Bedeutung, dass in dem Patentanspruch technische Vorrichtungen und Größen genannt sind. Entscheidend ist auch nicht, dass für die Durchführung des erfindungsgemäßen Verfahrens technische Mittel sinnvoll sind oder gar alleine in Betracht kommen (Entscheidung des Senats PV. Schließlich ist es ohne Bedeutung, dass das durch die Anwendung der Lehre gewonnene Ergebnis auf technischem Gebiet Verwendung findet (Senatsentscheidung "Straken". Es kommt vielmehr lediglich darauf an, in welchen Anweisungen der als neu und erfinderisch beanspruchte Kern der Lehre zu sehen ist, das heißt, in welchen Schritten das Problem der fertigen Lösung zugeführt wird. Betrachtet man die in dem angefochtenen Beschluss zutreffend und auch von der Rechtsbeschwerde in diesem Punkt unbeanstandet als entscheidend herausgestellten Verfahrensschritte unter den genannten Gesichtspunkten, dann erweist sich, dass der Kern der Lehre in einem untechnischen Denkschema besteht und dass, ähnlich dem in der Entscheidung "Dispositionsprogramm" behandelten Fall, das Gebiet der Technik erst betreten wird, nachdem die eigentliche Problemlösung bereits abgeschlossen ist. ... Die für die Gewinnung der Messwerte bedeutsamen technischen Größen (z.B. die Betriebsbedingungen des Kühlbetts und der Kaltschere) und Mittel (Messvorrichtungen) sind ebensowenig Bestandteil der über den Bereich des Gedanklich-Schematischen nicht hinausgehenden Problemlösung wie die zur Berechnung und zur Steuerung der Anlage nach den Ergebnissen der Berechnung eingesetzten Apparaturen. Im Vergleich zu dem von dem Senat in der genannten Entscheidung behandelten Dispositionsprogramm liegen Unterschiede der hier zu beurteilenden Lehre nur darin, dass die nach dem Programm verarbeiteten Werte eine Beziehung zu technischen Vorgängen haben und dass die mit Hilfe des Programms gewonnenen Ergebnisse Verwertung in einem technischen Verfahren finden. Wie der Senat wiederholt ausgesprochen hat, rechtfertigen solche Unterschiede eine Beurteilung der Lehre als eine technische nicht.

Automatic Data Processing (ADP) has today become an indispensable auxiliary tool in all domains of human society and will remain so in the future. It is ubiquitous. ... Its instrumental meaning, its auxiliary and ancillary function distinguish ADP from the ... individual fields of technology and liken it to such areas as enterprise administration, whose work results and methods ... are needed by all enterprises and for which therefore prima facie a need-to-keep-free is indicated.

A computer program may take various forms, e.g. an algorithm, a flow-chart or a series of coded instructions which can be recorded on a tape or other machine-readable record-medium, and can be regarded as a particular case of either a mathematical method or a presentation or information. If the contribution to the known art resides solely in a computer program then the subject matter is not patentable in whatever manner it may be presented in the claims. For example, a claim to a computer characterised by having the particular program stored in its memory or to a process for operating a computer under control of the program would be as objectionable as a claim to the program per se or the program when recorded on magnetic tape.

[...]

In considering whether an invention is present, [the examiner] should disregard the form or kind of claim and concentrate on the content in order to identify the novel contribution which the alleged "invention" claimed makes to the known art. If this contribution does not constitute an invention, there is not patentable subject matter. This point is illustrated by the examples ... of different ways of claiming a computer program.

1. Die Begrenzung des Patentschutzes auf das Gebiet der Technik hat zur Folge, dass wesentliche geistige Leistungen von hohem wirtschaftlichem Wert unberücksichtigt bleiben.

So pflegen das Erarbeiten des Lösungsprinzips, das einem Computerprogramm zugrundeliegt, seine Umsetzung in Programmvorstufe wie Ablaufplan oder Datenflussplan und schließlich das maschinenlesbare Programm selbst beträchtlichen Aufwand zu erfordern. Die geistigen Leistungen, die dabei erbracht werden, sind gewiss nicht generell geringer als bei vielen patentwürdigen technischen Erfindungen. Wirtschaftlich ist Datenverarbeitungs-Software oft von bedeutendem Wert; ...

Der BGH lehnt es freilich ab, auf das Erfordernis des technischen Charakters zu verzichten.

...

Durch Ausdehnung des Technikbegriffs den Anwendungsbereich des Patentschutzes zu erweitern, hält der BGH ebenfalls nicht für richtig.

...

Auch im Schrifttum wird auf die Abgrenzungsfunktion des Erfordernisses technischen Charakters hingewiesen.

Im Falle seiner Lockerung werde Schritt für Schritt allen Lehren für verstandesmäßige Tätigkeit der Patentschutz eröffnet; hiergegen bestünden Bedenken insbesondere wegen der Freihaltebedürfnisse in Bezug auf Arbeitsergebnisse und Methoden der Betriebswirtschaft (für Management, Organisation, Rechnungswesen, Finanzierung, Werbung, Marketing usw.), die von allen Wirtschaftsunternehmen benötigt würden, und auf Algorithmen, wie sie Computerprogrammen zugrundeliegen.

Auf der anderen Seite wird eine Überprüfung des Ausschlusses nichttechnischer Handlungsanweisungen verlangt, da er vorwiegend historisch bedingt und nicht mehr zeitgemäß sei.

2. Für das geltende Recht wird es bei der vom BGH bekräftigten Begrenzung des Patentschutzes auf technische Erfindungen sein Bewenden haben müssen. Neben der ausdrücklichen Regelung in §1 Abs 2 PatG und Art 52 Abs 2 EPÜ erlaubt es auch die bestehende institutionelle und organisatorische Ausgestaltung des Patentwesens, die durchweg auf das Gebiet der Technik zugeschnitten ist, nicht, hierüber durch richterliche Rechtsfortbildung hinauszugehen.

Eine gesetzgeberische Fortentwicklung hätte jedenfalls daran festzuhalten, dass Ausschlussrechte von nicht übersehbarer Tragweite vermieden werden müssen; mindestens Entdeckungen, wissenschaftlichen Theorien und mathematischen Methoden müsste deshalb der Patentschutz verschlossen bleiben.

3. Dagegen ist im Bereich der nichttechnischen Handlungsanweisungen und der Informationsvermittlung nicht notwendigerweise der mögliche Anwendungsbereich von Neuerungen so breit, dass die Reichweite eines Ausschlussrechts unkalkulierbar werden muss. Ob sich die Zulassung zum Patentschutz empfiehlt, hängt davon ab, wie die Schutz- und Belohnungsinteressen im Vergleich zu den Freihaltebedürfnissen zu werten sind.

Tendenziell dürfte hierbei das Freihaltebedürfnis schwerer wiegen als bei technischen Erfindungen, weil Ausschlussrechte an Neuerungen, die der Mensch ohne Einsatz von Naturkräften benutzen kann, weniger als solche an technischen Erfindungen durch außerhalb seiner selbst liegende Objekte definiert sind und deshalb regelmäßig unmittelbarer und stärker in seine Handlungsfreiheit eingreifen. Insbesondere wären von Ausschlussrechten an kommerziellen Neuerungen erhebliche wettbewerbsbeschränkende Effekte zu befürchten.

Kein hinreichendes Argument für die Gewährung von Patentschutz ist der Umstand, dass die geistige Leistung, der sie zugutekommen soll, anderweitig nicht oder nicht umfassend geschützt ist. Vielmehr können die Grenzen des nach geltendem Recht erreichbaren Schutzes auch Anzeichen dafür sein, dass den Freihaltungsinteressen der Vorrang gebührt.

Dies ist so weit vom Wortlaut entfernt, dass eine Bestrafung aufgrund eines infolge dieser gesetzwidrigen Auslegung erteilten Patentes mit dem Gesetzlichkeitsprinzip (Art. 103 Absatz 2 des Grundgesetzes) in Widerspruch steht. Es ist eine völlige Neuformulierung der Schranke in Absatz 3, die mit dem Wortlaut des Gesetzes nichts mehr gemein hat. Die technische Beschwerdekammer überschreitet damit klar die Grenzen richterlicher Tätigkeit. Wer die Formulierung "als solche" durch die Formulierung "ohne technischen Charakter" ersetzen möchte, muss dies durch eine entsprechende Änderung des Vertragstextes nach den dafür erforderlichen Verfahren bewirken. Die Rechtsprechung kann dies nicht.

[...]

Die Behauptung, die Beschränkung des Ausschlusses von Software von der Patentierbarkeit auf Software als solche in Absatz 3 habe den Zweck, im Lichte der Entwicklung der Informationstechnik durch Anerkennung der Patentierbarkeit den technischen Fortschritt zu fördern, überzeugt nicht. Falls der Gesetzgeber einen solchen Zweck verfolgt haben sollte, hätte er den Ausschluss in Absatz 2 von vornherein nicht vorgesehen. Die Unterstellung eines mit dem gewünschten Ergebnis übereinstimmenden Gesetzeszweckes ist zwar keine korrekte Anwendung der teleologischen Auslegungsmethode, zeigt aber deutlich die Bereitschaft der technischen Beschwerdekammer, die eigenen Wertungen an die Stelle der Wertung des Gesetzgebers zu setzen.

The definition of the concept of invention, which is constitutionalized in the Nordic countries, contains the requirement that the invention must have a technical character. An exact definition of what this means can hardly be given, but within the concept lies definitely a requirement that an invention must be a solution of a problem by means of natural forces, i.e. by means of a causally determined use of natural matter and energy.

It was never the object of those laws to grant a monopoly for every trifling device, every shadow of a shade of an idea, which would naturally and spontaneously occur to any skilled mechanic or operator in the ordinary progress of manufactures. Such an indiscriminate creation of exclusive privileges tends rather to obstruct than to stimulate invention. It creates a class of speculative schemers who make it their business to watch the advancing wave of improvement, and gather its foam in the form of patented monopolies, which enable them to lay a heavy tax upon the industry of the country, without contributing anything to the real advancement of the arts. It embarrasses the honest pursuit of business with fears and apprehensions of concealed liens and unknown liabilities lawsuits and vexatious accountings for profits made in good faith.

Handbuch des Deutschen Patentsrechts, 1900

After jurisprudence has taken hold of any area treated by the law, it is up to science to develop it and all the other disciplines must resign; from now on it is the method of judicial thinking which must rule.

What are those qualifications? Is he a lawyer? Has he ever practiced law? Has he any law degree? ... Professor Hamilton ... prior to his Professorship in the Yale Law School was a Professor of Economics ... It does not appear that an affirmative answer could be given ... to any of the foregoing pertinent questions as to his qualifications to speak as an expert on the subject of patents or the patent system.

In fact, in my view, most patent lawyers -- most lawyers in general -- fit into the category "Pompous Pedagogues Pronouncing Patent Policies", to the extent they themselves unthinkingly spout pro-patent slogans. That is because most patent and IP and even other attorneys with an opinion on this issue mindlessly parrot the simpleminded economics with which they were propagandized in law school. Virtually every patent lawyer will reiterate the mantra that "we need patents to stimulate innovation," as if they have given deep and careful thought to this. Of course, virtually none of them have. They repeat what they have read in Supreme Court and CAFC (Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the primary federal appellate court dealing with patent law issues) opinions as if the positive law enunciated by government functionaries is some Holy Writ. It does not take a genius to figure out why most patent lawyers are in favor of the patent system; and it is not because they have really studied the matter and dispassionately concluded that society is better off with a patent system -- it is because they don't want to see the system that pays the mortgage for them eroded or abolished.

However, in response to pressure from the computer industry and trends emerging in the US, the European Patent Office reviewed its guidelines in 1985.

Würde Computerimplementierungen von nichttechnischen Verfahren schon deshalb technischer Charakter zugestanden, weil sie jeweils unterschiedliche spezifische Eigenschaften zeigen, etwa weniger Rechenzeit oder weniger Speicherplatz benötigen, so hätte dies zur Konsequenz dass jeglicher Computerimplementierung technischer Charakter zuzubilligen wäre. Denn jedes andersartige Verfahren zeigt bei seiner Implementierung andersartige Eigenschaften, erweist sich entweder als besonders rechenzeitsparend oder als speicherplatzsparend. Diese Eigenschaften beruhen - jedenfalls im vorliegenden Fall - nicht auf einer technischen Leistung, sondern sind durch das gewählte nichttechnische Verfahren vorgegeben. Würde schon das Erfüllen einer solchen Aufgabenstellung den technischen Charakter einer Computerimplementierung begründen, so wäre jeder Implementierung eines nichttechnischen Verfahrens Patentierbarkeit zuzubilligen; dies aber liefe der Folgerung des Bundesgerichtshofs zuwider, dass das gesetzliche Patentierungsverbot für Computerprogramme verbiete, jedwede in computergerechte Anweisungen gekleidete Lehre als patentierbar zu erachten.

Zusammenfassend ist festzustellen, dass auf der Basis des aktuellen Rechts eine Grundlage für einen umfassenden Patentschutz für Software nicht zu erkennen ist. Eine Auslegung, die zu einem solchen Schutz führt, beruht auf Unterstellungen, die im EPÜ und den ihm folgenden nationalen Patentgesetzen gerade wegen des technischen Charakters von Software keine tragfähige Grundlage finden; sie ist darüber hinaus auch deshalb abzulehnen, weil sie ohne hinreichende Rechtfertigung die Lösung eines gesellschaftlichen Konfliktes zum Nachteil einer der beteiligten Gruppen bewirkt, ohne deren mangelnde Schutzfähigkeit feststellen zu können. Zur Lösung dieses Konfliktes bedarf es einer Entscheidung des Gesetzgebers, der sich dabei allerdings erst dieses Konfliktes und der ihm zu Grunde liegenden Interessengegensätze gewahr werden und die Grundlagen seiner Entscheidung dieses Konfliktes klären muss. Die Richtlinie der Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, die erst nach Abschluss des vorliegenden Manuskripts zugänglich geworden ist, genügt diesem Anspruch nicht; sie ist zudem mit ihrer weitgehenden Bejahung einer Patentierung von Software so nicht in das System des EPÜ einzuordnen.

We and our clients, mainly small software companies, are concerned about the proposed patent directive.

Erst kürzlich hatten wir eine Patentkonkurrenz prüfen (einen eventuellen Konflikt mit einem konkreten US-Patent) lassen und wir schalteten dafür eine hochspezialisierte, deutsche Patentanwaltskanzlei ein.

Die Diagnose dieser Kanzlei (für ca. 4000,00 Euro netto) war: Für die Prüfung, ob eine Verletzung des gezielt benannten US-Patents vorliegt verlangt ein US-amerikanischer Patentanwalt 25.000,00 USD Vorschuss. Schlimmer aber ist, dass nach deren Prognose die Aussage des amerikanischen Kollegen nicht lauten wird: "ja - Patentverletzung" oder "nein - keine Patentverletzung". Die Antwort wird - nach der Prognose der deutschen Spezialisten sein -: "Möglicherweise", "Es ist nicht auszuschließen, dass ...". Damit soll nicht mangelhafte Ausbildung der Kollegen gerügt werden, denn schon die deutschen Spezialisten erkannten: Recherchen, geschweige denn: Prüfungen, sind zumindest im Bereich der Bioinformatiksoftwarepatente oft nicht mehr wirklich leistbar.

Thus, stronger patent rights may hinder the development of effective competition in the telecommunication markets. Patentability of principles or ideas might further result in strategic patenting against compatibility. This could be particularly lethal to the content industry and further to the markets of the future generations of cellular mobile telephones and services. Currently avail able empirical evidence does not allow us to make definite conclusions. However, it suggests that strengthening of patent rights in the communication sector or extending patent protection to cover intellectual property currently protected by copyright involves great potential risks.

[...]

Developed and developing countries have historically provided that certain things do not constitute inventions for the purpose of patent protection. Included in these are those set out, for example, in Article 52 of the European Patent Convention (EPC):

1. discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods;
2. aesthetic creations;
3. schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or doing business, and programmes for computers;
4. presentations of information.

[...]

Even though subsequent EPO practice and jurisprudence have to some extent diluted the scope of these Articles,13 it would seem entirely reasonable for most developing countries to adopt this list of exclusions as a minimum.

[...]

Summary of Recommendations Relating to the Patent System

[...]

Exclude from patentability computer programs and business methods

Rechtlicher Ausgangspunkt für die Betrachtungen ist das Europäische Patentübereinkommen (EPÜ). Es wurde 1973 in München unterzeichnet und zählt 20 Vertragsstaaten. Europäische Patente werden generell für Erfindungen erteilt, die neu sind, auf erfinderischer Tätigkeit beruhen und gewerblich anwendbar sind. Expressis verbis ausgeschlossen sind gemäß Art. 52 Abs. 2 lit. c EPÜ jedoch "Programme für Datenverarbeitungsanlagen". Dennoch hat das Europäische Patentamt (EPA) vielfach Patente für technische Erfindungen erteilt, bei denen ein Computerprogramm verwendet wird. Das EPA geht nämlich davon aus, dass durch das EPÜ nicht alle Computerprogramme von der Patentierbarkeit ausgeschlossen sind und verweist auf den technischen Charakter³ einer Erfindung als wesentliche Voraussetzung für ihre Patentierbarkeit. Es unterscheidet folglich zwischen patentfähigen und nicht patentfähigen Computerprogrammen nach dem Kriterium der Technizität. Demnach ist ein rein abstraktes Werk ohne technischen Charakter nicht patentfähig; es muss ein zusätzlicher technischer Effekt (Mehreffekt) vorliegen. Das EPA schafft damit einen zusätzlichen Ausschlusstatbestand, der sich aus Wortlaut und Systematik des Art. 52 EPÜ nicht ergibt und nur mit einem Zirkelschluss begründet werden kann. Da der technische Charakter einer Erfindung Voraussetzung für ihre Patentierbarkeit ist und das EPÜ ein Patentierungsverbot für Computerprogramme enthält, muss es nach dem Verständnis des EPA Computerprogrammen ohne zusätzlichen technischen Effekt an der Technizität mangeln. Diese Auslegung zäumt das Pferd von hinten auf und ist mit dem Wortlaut des Art. 52 EPÜ nicht vereinbar.

[...]

Aus ökonomischer Sicht ist die Sinnhaftigkeit eines Patentschutzes danach zu beurteilen, ob dieser effiziente Anreize für die Investition in Forschung und Entwicklung setzt. Immaterielle Güter zeichnen sich dadurch aus, dass sie beliebig und kostenlos reproduzierbar sind und der Konsum von Wissen durch eine Person eine andere Person nicht daran hindert, dieses Wissen ebenfalls zu konsumieren. Der Einzelne wird deshalb nur so viel in die Produktion von Wissen investieren, wie er durch seinen eigenen Konsum rechtfertigen kann. Dies führt insgesamt zu einer ineffizient niedrigen Produktion von Wissen. Deshalb müssen Anreize, z.B. durch Patente, geschaffen werden, die die kostenintensive Produktion von Wissen in einem darüber hinausgehenden Maß bewirken. Ökonomisch gesehen wird bei einem Patent ein (ineffizientes) Monopol vorübergehend gewährt, um Produktionsanreize zu setzen. Das soeben dargestellte Modell ist weitgehend statisch. Kompliziertere Szenarien haben demgegenüber gezeigt, dass eine Verstärkung des Patentschutzes keineswegs zwingend zu einem vermehrten Forschungsaufwand führt. Im Gegensatz zur allgemeinen Annahme, dass weitgehender immaterialgüterrechtlicher Schutz zu höherer Investitionstätigkeit führt, vermochten Untersuchungen, die unter ähnlichen Bedingungen wie die der Softwareindustrie operiert⁶, eine generelle Zunahme der Ausgaben für Forschung und Entwicklung nicht nachzuweisen⁷. Empirische Studien über das Verhalten von kleinen und mittleren Unternehmen im Softwarebereich haben gezeigt, dass Patente für diese zu den am wenigsten effizienten Methoden des Investitionsschutzes zählen.

Vor diesem Hintergrund ist eine Ausdehnung des Patentschutzes auf Computerprogramme kritisch zu bewerten. Die Entwicklung von Software ist generell nicht kapitalintensiv, außerdem bestehen auf diesen Märkten bereits Netzeffekte, die wiederum Konzentrationstendenzen begünstigen. Durch Softwarepatente werden insbesondere für kleine und mittlere Unternehmen erhebliche Marktbarrieren entstehen. Open-Source-Softwareprodukte stellen ex definitione den Programmcode allen Interessierten zur Verfügung und könnten Patentschutz deshalb generell nicht in Anspruch nehmen. Die mit dem Patentschutz verbundene vorübergehende Monopolstellung eines Unternehmens ist geeignet, die Konzentrationstendenzen auf dem Markt für Softwareprodukte weiter zu verstärken und den Wettbewerb zu behindern.

Just because software hasn't experienced a cyber-Bhopal doesn't mean it won't ever happen. Indeed, the noxious clouds of litigation now gathering around e-commerce are renewing industry fears. ... There's ample historical evidence that overly broad patents have stifled innovation in emerging industries.

The effects of this substantial de facto broadening of patent subject matter to cover information inventions are as yet unclear. Because this expansion has occurred without any oversight from the legislative branch and takes patent law into uncharted territories, it would be worthwhile to study this phenomenon to ensure that the patent expansion is promoting the progress of science and the useful arts, as Congress intended.

There are many reasons to be concerned. ...

Since the benefits of the patent system are so tenuous and subtle and the overall benefit/cost ratio is considered to be negative, there is no economic justification for extending patent monopolies by lengthening the term, or by widening the grounds for either infringement, or patentability (for example, Plant Variety Rights or computer programs). However, in the light of our findings, there is considerable economic justification for policy action to reduce the negative effects of the patent system by stricter examination, by reducing the length of term and the scope of patent monopolies, and by action to deal with undesirable restrictive practices in patent licensing.

An historical awareness of the political economy of patent reform suggests that this task is not easy at the domestic policy level. This is basically because those who perceive they would lose by such reform are concentrated, powerful and active defenders of their interests. In contrast, those who would gain by patent reform are diffuse and hardly aware of their interest in the matter.

On the basis of the review and analysis contained in this first part of the working paper it is evident that Canada should give serious consideration to the possibility of abandoning the continued maintenance of a patent system in any form.

Bis zum Jahre 1873 war die Patentfrage heißumstrittenes Thema. Die Volkswirte hatten ihren Standpunkt mit Nachdruck vertreten, eifrig bemüht, die Öffentlichkeit und die Regierung zu überzeugen. Die Niederlage der Patentgegner - die in Regierungskreisen von vielen als ein Sieg der Juristen und anderer »Protektionisten« über die Mehrheit der Nationalökonomen angesehen wurde - veränderte den Charakter der volkswirtschaftlichen Erörterungen und Stellungnahmen zum Patentwesen. Die Flut von Büchern, Flugschriften und Artikeln über die wirtschaftlichen Grundlagen des Patentschutzes nahm ein Ende, die Nationalökonomen hatten das Interesse an der Patentfrage verloren und wandten sich anderen Problemen zu.

Up to the present, the regime for the international protection of patent rights has been developed primarily in the interests of patentees. The gains to be derived from an extension of the patent system have been stressed, but the concomitant increase in social costs has been seriously neglected.

Patents as an instrument to stimulate innovative activities appear to be of little relevance for small firms. It was found that no significant changes in R&D behavior would take place if the patent protection time were reduced or extended. Also, for large firms, the R&D behavior seems to be rather independent of the availability of patent protection. The survey showed that increased patent protection time is likely to provide, at most, a modest stimulus for R&D activities. Chemical, and particularly pharmaceutical, firms appear to be more sensitive to such changes.

It appears that patent policy is a very blunt instrument trying to solve a very delicate problem. Its bluntness derives largely from the narrowness of what patent breadth can depend on, namely the realized values of the technologies. As a consequence, the prospects for fine-tuning the patent system seem limited, which may be an argument for more public sponsorship of basic research.

Inventions do not belong in the category of intellectual property, because inventions are emanations of the current state of civilization and, thus, are common property. ... What the artist or poet create is always something quite individual and cannot simultaneously be created by anyone else in exact likeness. In the case of inventions, however, this is easily possible, and experience has taught us that one and the same invention can be made at the same time by two different persons; inventions are merely blossoms on the tree of civilization.

I believe the law is essentially deficient because it aims at a purpose which cannot be rationally achieved. It tries to parcel up a stream of creative thought into a serious of distinct claims, each of which constitutes the basis of a separately owned monopoly. But the growth of human knowledge cannot be divided up into such sharply circumscribed phases. Ideas usually develop shades of emphasis, and even when, from time to time, sparks of discovery flare up and suddenly reveal a new understanding, it usually appears on closer scrutiny that the new idea had at least been partly foreshadowed in previous speculations. Moreover, discovery and invention do not progress only along one sequence of thought, which perhaps could somehow be divided up into consecutive segments. Mental progress interacts at every stage with the whole network of human knowledge and draws at every moment on the most varied and diverse stimuli. Invention, and particularly modern invention which relies more and more on a systematic process of trial and error, is a drama enacted on a crowded stage. It may be possible to analyze its various scenes and acts, and to ascribe different degrees of merit to the participants; but it is not possible, in general, to attribute to any of them one decisive self-contained mental operation which can be formulated in a definitive claim.

.... the fairness of the patent laws is contested on the ground that they reward only those who put the finishing touch leading to practical utilization of achievements on many predecessors. These precursors go empty-handed although their contribution to the final result was often much more weighty than that of the patentee.

In the field of industrial patents in particular we shall have seriously to examine whether the award of a monopoly privilege is really the most appropriate and effective form of reward for the kind of risk bearing which investment in scientific research involves.

Expedients such as licenses of right, nevertheless, cannot repair the lack of theoretical principle behind the whole patent system. They can only serve to confine the evils of monopoly within the limits contemplated by the legislators; and, as I have endeavoured to show, the science of economics, as it stands today, furnishes no basis of justification for this enormous experiment in the encouragement of a particular activity by enabling monopolistic price control.

If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.

If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of everyone, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it...He who receives an idea from me, receives instructions himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me. That ideas should be spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature ... Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property.

Im Grunde aber sind wir alle kollektive Wesen, wir mögen uns stellen wie wir wollen. Denn wie weniges haben und sind wir, das wir im reinsten Sinne unser Eigentum nennen! Wir müssen alle empfangen und lernen, sowohl von denen, die vor uns waren, als von denen, die mit uns sind. Selbst das größte Genie würde nicht weit kommen, wenn es alles seinem eigenen Inneren verdanken wollte. Das begreifen aber viele sehr gute Menschen nicht und tappen mit ihren Träumen von Originalität ein halbes Leben im Dunkeln. ... Es ist im Grunde auch alles Torheit, ob einer etwas aus sich habe oder ob er es von anderen habe; ob einer durch sich wirke oder ob er durch andere wirke: die Hauptsache ist, daß man ein großes Wollen habe und Geschick und Beharrlichkeit besitze, es auszuführen; ...

Le brevet servait à rentabiliser les efforts de recherche-développement. Au lieu de servir l'innovation, il a été détourné pour miner le terrain et neutraliser les innovateurs gênants, en leur envoyant des avocats dans les pattes au moment d'une levée de fonds ou quand ils essaient de trouver des clients.

Although for the time being the scope of application of the Commission's proposal for a directive concerns computer-implemented inventions, to which are attached the classic, cumulative criteria limiting the field of application of patentability - which will not satisfy those in favour of purely and simply abolishing all limits on the field of application of patent law - the text is, nonetheless, a de facto acceptance and justification of the a posteriori drift of EPO jusriprudence. While at first glance the directive seems to advocate something less extreme than the pure and simple abolition of Article 52(2) of the EPC, which is what the EPO executive and some Council members want, it does nonetheless open the way to the future patentability of the entire software field, in particular by the admission that the "technical effect" can amount to the simple fact of a program running on a standard computer.

One may well wonder what the real objective of the Directive is, in particular given the explanatory memorandum, which begins with considerations about the need to protect the software industry against piracy, and in the documents appended to the Directive discusses almost exclusively software and the "software industry", whose influence on the proposal seems excessive yet entirely irrelevant, if the scope of application was really as limited as the Commission maintains.

Is it wise in today's world to widen the scope of patents, tools of the industrial age, to intellectual works which are immaterial, such as software, and to the results of running software on a computer? The reply is quite explicit and partisan in the presentation of the proposal for a directive and the impact assessment form. The narrow field of vision that has been adopted, based on the legal regime for patents as the sole motivation, without sufficient consideration of the economic factors, the impact on research or on European companies, which therefore lacks a view of the whole, is not consistent with the importance of the implications for society, for development and indeed for democracy (e-administration, education, citizens' information), which in the longterm is what is at stake.

The COR would draw the Commission's attention to the dangers that might arise from systematically relying on patents in the field of intellectual property, since patent protection is not universal. This applies mainly to the new technologies, and especially to information technologies and the life sciences, which are the subject of a detailed and heated debate.

In the case of software, the debates that have taken place since the 1970s in the main countries concerned have all led to a copyright system, although such a legal framework is not entirely suited to the sector's specific requirements. The European Directive of 1 January 1993 has shown some wisdom in encouraging interoperability among programmes so as to counteract the anti-competitive strategies of seeking a dominant position. But for several years now, US case law has been led into allowing the issuing of patents for software "components", a practice to which it had previously been hostile. And the US is putting increasing pressure on Europe to allow software patenting.

The stakes here are extremely high. Such a practice would threaten the progress of innovation in this industry, since it would lead to a compartmentalisation of knowledge and procedures, thereby preventing any interaction. The multitude of patents registered and granted in the USA include a very large number of procedures, or even algorithms. Many of them seem a long way from satisfying the criteria of novelty and originality which, theoretically, are the basis for issuing a patent.

If the issuing of patents for software became institutionalised, it would strengthen the dominant position of the biggest US market leaders in the sector. It would be a direct threat to the huge number of innovating smaller firms in Europe, the USA and in other countries. Finally, it would be a very severe handicap for the European software industry, which has a hard time remaining commercially competitive despite its high level of competence.

Parmi les questions importantes pour l'avenir de l'industrie logicielle européenne, l'instauration d'une éventuelle brevetabilité du logiciel présente un véritable caractère d'urgence, compte-tenu de l'avancement des travaux européens en ce domaine et de la politique du fait accompli menée constamment par l'Office Européen des Brevets. Avant d'instaurer la protection du logiciel par le brevet (comme les Etats-Unis nous le demandent), le Parti Socialiste considère qu'il est indispensable de s'assurer que son absence est vraiment pénalisante pour les éditeurs européens de logiciels. Les études économiques conduisent plutôt à penser que les brevets logiciels sont aujourd'hui une arme aux mains des grandes entreprises, qui en usent pour bloquer toute innovation gênante ou pour limiter le recours aux logiciels libres. L'expérience américaine des brevets logiciels, particulièrement négative, mérite réflexion.

Le brevet logiciel n'est pas forcément adapté au rythme de l'innovation dans ce secteur : son délai d'obtention est trop long, comme la durée de la protection (20 ans). Les innovations dans le domaine du logiciel sont dans leur nature très proches de la découverte mathématique : nouvelle méthode de calcul, nouvel algorithme ou technique mathématique connue appliquée à un problème spécifique. Comment et où tracer la ligne de partage entre procédé logiciel et méthode intellectuelle ? Il faut aussi rappeler que le logiciel bénéfice déjà, dans notre droit de la propriété intellectuelle, d'une protection juridique significative.

Propositions

Les négociations en cours au plan européen appellent donc des positions fermes : ainsi, tant qu'il n'est pas démontré qu'elle pourrait favoriser effectivement l'innovation, les socialistes considèrent que :

• la brevetabilité du logiciel doit être refusée.
• les dérives constatées dans le fonctionnement de l'Office européen des brevets (OEB) combattues.

Parmi les questions importantes pour l'avenir de l'industrie logicielle européenne, l'instauration d'une éventuelle brevetabilité du logiciel présente un véritable caractère d'urgence, compte-tenu de l'avancement des travaux européens en ce domaine et de la politique du fait accompli menée constamment par l'Office Européen des Brevets. Avant d'instaurer la protection du logiciel par le brevet (comme les Etats-Unis nous le demandent), le Parti Socialiste considère qu'il est indispensable de s'assurer que son absence est vraiment pénalisante pour les éditeurs européens de logiciels. Les études économiques conduisent plutôt à penser que les brevets logiciels sont aujourd'hui une arme aux mains des grandes entreprises, qui en usent pour bloquer toute innovation gênante ou pour limiter le recours aux logiciels libres. L'expérience américaine des brevets logiciels, particulièrement négative, mérite réflexion.

Le brevet logiciel n'est pas forcément adapté au rythme de l'innovation dans ce secteur : son délai d'obtention est trop long, comme la durée de la protection (20 ans). Les innovations dans le domaine du logiciel sont dans leur nature très proches de la découverte mathématique : nouvelle méthode de calcul, nouvel algorithme ou technique mathématique connue appliquée à un problème spécifique. Comment et où tracer la ligne de partage entre procédé logiciel et méthode intellectuelle ? Il faut aussi rappeler que le logiciel bénéfice déjà, dans notre droit de la propriété intellectuelle, d'une protection juridique significative.

Propositions

Les négociations en cours au plan européen appellent donc des positions fermes : ainsi, tant qu'il n'est pas démontré qu'elle pourrait favoriser effectivement l'innovation, les socialistes considèrent que :

• la brevetabilité du logiciel doit être refusée.
• les dérives constatées dans le fonctionnement de l'Office européen des brevets (OEB) combattues.

Les logiciels .. doivent continuer a être protégés par le droit d'auteur plutôt que le brevet.

L'extension du domaine des brevets aux logiciels, absurdité économique qui handicaperait nos entreprises et freinerait le développement de ce secteur, doit être refusée.

Le système de brevet s'est étendu depuis quelques années bien au-delà de son domaine de légitimité historique, économique et éthique. Cette extension est le résultat de décisions de jurisprudence de l'Office Européen des Brevets (OEB) qui sont parfois prises en contradiction avec l'esprit de la loi, telle qu'elle a été ratifiée par le législateur, et le plus souvent sans que les Etats signataires de la convention de Munich ne disposent des moyens de contrôler la portée économique et sociale de ces décisions. En particulier, je considère qu'en affirmant qu'un « programme d'ordinateur présentant des effets techniques » n'est pas « un programme d'ordinateur en tant que tel » et peut donc faire l'objet d'un brevet, l'Office des Européen des Brevets a clairement abusé de son pouvoir. L'OEB a en effet développé une jurisprudence manifestement contraire à la convention internationale qu'il est sensé appliquer, puisque tous les programmes d'ordinateurs ont un effet technique, comme l'ont très justement rappelé dès 1997 les experts européens en propriété industrielle réunis lors de la table ronde sur la « brevetabilité des logiciels » qui s'est tenue à Munich.

Cette extension incontrôlée du système de brevet dans le domaine du logiciel contribue à mettre en péril de façon croissante les entreprises informatiques européennes, les auteurs de logiciels libres et les principes fondamentaux qui ont permis l'essor de la société de l'information. Plus de 10,000 brevets logiciels ont été déposés depuis 10 ans à l'Office Européen des Brevets par des astuces de procédure cautionnées par l'OEB alors même que les guides distribués depuis 10 ans par les offices nationaux de brevets rappellent clairement que les programmes d'ordinateur ne peuvent être brevetés. Plus de 75% de ces brevets ont été déposés par des entreprises non-européennes. Nombre de ces brevets logiciels portent sur des méthodes de commerce électronique, voire des méthodes d'organisation des entreprises ou des méthodes éducatives.

Mais, comme il est rappelé dans les manuels de référence juridique tels que le Lamy Droit Informatique, ces brevets n'ont de valeur que celle que l'on veut bien leur accorder en raison de la contradiction manifeste qui existe aujourd'hui entre le droit positif et le système jurisprudentiel de l'OEB. En cas de contentieux, il n'est pas certain qu'un juge national accepterait la validité de ces brevets en raison de leur objet, manifestement contraires à l'esprit de la loi. Les détenteurs de brevets logiciels, de brevets sur le commerce électronique et de brevet Internet n'attendent donc qu'une chose pour attaquer les acteurs français et européens de la nouvelle économie: une révision de la convention de Munich qui supprimerait l'exception sur les programmes d'ordinateurs.

Aussi, je vous serais reconnaissant de bien vouloir user dans les consultations nationales, européennes ou mondiales à venir, de tous les moyens qui sont en votre pouvoir pour exiger:

1. de ne pas modifier en novembre 2000 l'article 52 de la convention de Munich, afin de ne pas activer le "cheval de troie" qui sommeille actuellement à l'OEB où de nombreux brevets Internet accordés abusivement à des entreprises non-européennes peuvent menacer du jour au lendemain la nouvelle économie française et européenne.
2. que soient garantis par la loi un "droit à diffuser ses propres oeuvres originales" (logiciels y compris) ainsi qu'un « droit à la compatibilité » tel qu'il est défini dans la proposition de loi déposée avec MM. Paul, Cohen et Bloche.
3. que les termes « technique », « application industrielle » et « programme en tant que tel » soient clarifiés de façon à ce que toute oeuvre, tout produit informationnel immatériel (y compris un logiciel sur un support d'information) ne soit ni admis dans le champ de la brevetabilité ni dans celui de la fourniture de moyen de contrefaçon de brevet.
4. que tout produit matériel, extension d'un produit informationnel immatériel (ex. un lecteur MP3) puisse être breveté à condition que soient satisfaits les critères de nouveauté, de technicité et d'application industrielle de ce produit matériel, considéré indépendamment des éléments logiciels qu'il exploite.
5. que soit lancé dans les plus brefs délais un débat ouvert et démocratique fondé sur